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I. INTRODUCTION
[1] In June 1999, Sandy Murphy and Rick Tabish were arrested and
charged with murder, robbery, burglary, and grand larceny related to the
death of Las Vegas casino mogul Lonnie “Ted” Binion.1 The subsequent
trial provided a captivated public with the elements of murder, greed,
betrayal, torture, and extortion.2
[2] Magellan Research (a public opinion research firm owned by the
author of this article) was contacted by members of the defense team to
conduct public opinion polls on their behalf. Magellan conducted three
polls during the trial.3 The first poll was conducted just days before jury
selection. It questioned a random sample of the general public and
collected their answers to key questions from completed jury
* J.D. Boyd School of Law, magna cum laude, University of Nevada Las Vegas 2001.
B.B.A., Management Information Systems, Texas Tech University, 1982. The author is a
practicing attorney and President/CEO of Magellan Research, a Las Vegas-based public
opinion research firm.
1
Jeff German, Murphy, Tabish Jailed in Binion Murder Case, LAS VEGAS SUN, June 25,
2000, http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/archives/1999/jun/25/508975973.html
(last visited Oct. 6, 2006).
2
Id.
3
This article is only concerned with the first poll conducted by Magellan. The second
poll questioned people watching the trial on television regarding the believability of
witnesses and the effectiveness of counsel and the judge. The third poll, conducted
immediately prior to closing arguments, questioned these same viewers on the verdicts
they would issue if they were on the jury. Members of this “electronic jury” indicated
that they, too, would have returned “guilty” verdicts on nearly all counts.
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questionnaires. The defense then compared the poll results to the
responses of the prospective jurors.4
[3] The defense applied the poll results to the jury questionnaires to
determine which jurors would be most advantageous to the defense. The
defense devised a rating scale (based on key questionnaire answers and
demographic data) and ranked 296 members of the jury venire. Although
these efforts were ultimately unsuccessful (both defendants were
convicted),5 the defense selected a jury 97% certain (if the jurors were
indeed representative of the public at large) that the defendants were guilty
that nevertheless needed eight days of deliberation to return guilty
verdicts.
[4] Though the polling was valuable to the defense, a lingering question
remained: is the use of polling and questionnaires in jury selection fair and
proper? The propriety of using polling and questionnaires to select a jury
should be evaluated with a careful eye toward the potential for conflict
with the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Batson v. Kentucky6 and J.E.B.
v. Alabama ex rel T.B.7 These cases dealt with race and gender based
discrimination, respectively, in jury selection. The Court held in these
cases that use of peremptory challenges to strike jurors for discriminatory
reasons was unconstitutional.8 It became apparent during the Binion trial
that the techniques employed by the defense might be used to circumvent
Batson and its progeny. An overzealous attorney could conceivably use
4

The first issue considered involved change of venue. The data indicated that, if the
defense wanted a change of venue, it would likely succeed using the poll results as a
barometer of public sentiment. Over 97% of the 624 people polled believed that Murphy
and Tabish were guilty of murder.
5
While both Murphy and Tabish were convicted of several charges including first-degree
murder, the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed all those convictions and remanded for a
new trial because the trial court failed to sever additional charges brought against Tabish
alone. Tabish v. State, 119 Nev. 293, 296, 314 (Nev. 2003). On retrial, a jury found
Murphy and Tabish not guilty of murder, robbery, and conspiracy to commit murder and
robbery, but guilty of conspiracy to commit burglary, burglary and grand larceny (Lisa
Sweetingham, Former Lovers Cleared of Casino Mogul’s Murder, COURTTV.COM, Nov.
23, 2004, http://www.courttv.com/trials/binion/112304_verdict_ctv.html (last visited Oct.
9, 2006)).
6
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
7
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
8
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 143; Batson, 476 U.S. at 82-83.
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information attained by an opinion poll or jury questionnaire to disguise a
conscious effort to eliminate potential jurors because of their race or
gender.
[5] For example, a venireman might be asked if he had ever owned a
handgun. At first glance, such a question might not seem discriminatory at
all. But what if, in a particular community, 92% of all black males owned
handguns while only 14% of the rest of the population owned handguns?
An attorney armed with this knowledge (which could be collected by
either public opinion polls or jury questionnaires) could conceivably strike
veniremen based on the response to this question, essentially excluding
black males from the jury in violation of both Batson and J.E.B. The
discriminatory intent and effect would remain even if the attorney was
forced to exclude a few handgun owners who were not black males (to
preserve the illusion). Therefore, it is possible that knowing too much
about the venire and the surrounding community could actually increase
the likelihood of discrimination in jury selection.
[6] The Texas Court of Appeals recently encountered this issue in Shelling
v. State.9 There, the Defendant was convicted of murdering a friend of his
estranged wife by shooting him five times, stabbing him 11 times, and
cutting his throat.10 The Defendant appealed his conviction on several
grounds, including a Batson claim.11 During the trial the State asked
veniremen if they believed the O. J. Simpson murder trial verdict was
correct.12 The State then used its peremptory challenges to strike members
of the panel that believed that the verdict was proper.13
[7] The State did not dispute that the Defendant established a prima facie
case that there was a discriminatory effect against African-Americans
under Batson.14 The State, however, rebutted the presumption that there
was purposeful discrimination by providing race-neutral reasons why each
of the strikes were made, and by noting that a white member of the venire
9

Shelling v. State, 52 S.W.3d 213 (Tex. App. 2001).
Id. at 217.
11
Id. at 218.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
10
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was struck who also believed that the Simpson verdict was correct.15 The
Court of Appeals, by a 6-3 vote, affirmed the judgment of the trial court in
that the State satisfied its burden of demonstrating that the strikes were not
racially motivated.16
[8] The Shelling decision highlights the problem now confronting courts
throughout the nation. Is it enough for a party to present a race-neutral
explanation to justify a peremptory strike? Are there questions that may
be posed to veniremen that serve as a pretext for discrimination against a
class of citizens? Can the court apply a test to determine whether such a
question has a discriminatory effect, whether intentional or accidental?
Part I of this article examines the series of cases that have established the
constitutional limits on the use of peremptory challenges. Additionally,
tools such as public opinion polls and jury questionnaires are examined
insofar as they might be employed in jury selection. Part II discusses the
problem of using questions that are merely a pretext for discrimination in
voir dire. Part II further offers a test for scientifically evaluating whether a
proposed question for the venire is appropriate and fair, or whether it is,
instead, merely a pretext designed to justify the use of peremptory
challenges based on race or gender. This proposed solution involves the
use of public opinion polls and/or juror questionnaires to help determine
whether particular responses are so closely associated with race, ethnic
origin, or gender that to use them as a basis for peremptory challenge
would be, in fact, discriminatory.
II. BACKGROUND
A. DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION
[9] The racial turmoil of the early 1960’s and the ratification of the Civil
Rights Act of 196417 were factors impacting the U.S. Supreme Court’s
most recent reviews of discrimination based on race in jury selection.
Until the 1960’s, the law in this area had been relatively well established.
For almost a hundred years prior to the Civil Rights Act, the seminal case

15

Shelling, 52 S.W.2d at 219-20.
Id. at 220.
17
See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (2005).
16
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in this area was Strauder v. West Virginia.18 In 1874 a black man was
tried and convicted of murder. Under West Virginia law at the time, white
males over the age of 21 were the only citizens eligible for jury service.19
In its opinion, the Court stated that ending the oppression of the Black race
was the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment.20 Therefore, the Court
held that the West Virginia statute excluding Blacks from serving on juries
violated the Equal Protection Clause.21 The Court further noted that this
conclusion did not guarantee that any defendant had a right to a jury
comprised (in whole or in part) of persons of similar color, but instead
held merely that state law could not, consistent with the Constitution,
exclude all persons of a particular race or color from jury service.22 It is
important to note that the Court’s decision was based on its concern for the
equal protection rights of the defendant, rather than for the rights of
prospective jurors excluded from jury service.23
[10] For ninety years Strauder remained the guiding force behind the
selection of grand juries and venire panels. In Swain v. Alabama,
however, the Court first considered the racially motivated use of
peremptory challenges in selecting the juries themselves, rather than in
assembly of the venire panel.24 In Swain, the defendant was a black man
accused of raping a white woman.25 During voir dire, the prosecutor used
peremptory challenges to exclude six of the eight black men in the
venire.26 Despite this overt act of discrimination, the Court held that the
defendant had failed to meet the burden of proving that black jurors had
been deliberately excluded.27 The Court held that peremptory challenges

18

Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
Id. at 305.
20
Id. at 306 (stating “[T]his is one of a series of constitutional provisions having a
common purpose; namely, securing to a race recently emancipated, a race that through
many generations had been held in slavery, all the civil rights that the superior race
enjoy.”).
21
Id. at 309.
22
Id. at 305.
23
Id.
24
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
25
Id. at 231.
26
Id. at 205.
27
Id. at 226 (finding that Alabama, while using jury selection procedures that
significantly reduced the representation of black males, had not totally excluded them
19
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were, by their very nature, discretionary.28 Subjecting litigants to Equal
Protection Clause scrutiny would weaken the value of discretionary
challenges and subject them to “scrutiny for reasonableness and
sincerity.”29
[11] Additionally, the Swain Court held that discrimination could only be
proven by showing that the prosecutor had consistently excluded black
jurors in other cases, regardless of the circumstances, crime, or racial
background of the parties.30 Thus, under Swain, a defendant could not rely
merely on the peremptory challenges exercised in his own case to show
discrimination; instead, he had to show a pattern of discrimination over a
series of cases.
This seemingly oppressive burden for proving
discrimination in jury selection remained the standard for over twenty
years, despite the fact that records concerning peremptory strikes were not
even kept by most courts.31
[12] The Court’s decision in Batson v. Kentucky32 relaxed the Swai court’s
“crippling burden of proof.”33 The defendant in Batson, a black man, was
convicted by an all-white jury of burglary and receipt of stolen goods.34
After voir dire, the prosecutor exercised his peremptory challenges to
exclude all of the blacks in the venire.35 In considering the defense’s
objection to these strikes, the trial court held that the parties were entitled
to use their peremptory strikes in any manner they chose.36 As in Strauder
and Swain, the Court analyzed the equal protection issue in terms of the
rights of the defendant rather than of prospective jurors.37 Unlike Swain,
however, the Batson Court held that a defendant need only show that he is
a “member of a cognizable group” to show discrimination, rather than
from jury service. Had Alabama done so, their jury selection scheme would have
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
28
Id. at 221.
29
Id. at 222.
30
Swain, 380 U.S. at 224.
31
Joel H. Swift, The Unconventional Equal Protection Jurisprudence of Jury Selection,
16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 295, 326 (1996).
32
Batson, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
33
Id. at 92.
34
Id. at 82-83.
35
Id. at 83.
36
Id.
37
Id.
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show the pattern of discrimination required under Swain.38 Hence, a
defendant could make a prima facie showing of purposeful racial
discrimination solely by using the facts of his own case, rather than having
to show a pattern of discriminatory acts.39
[13] Equally important is Batson’s articulation of a three-step, burden
shifting mechanism for evaluating claims of discrimination against black
jurors. First, the Court established that trial judges can use all relevant
circumstances to decide if a prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges
forms a prima facie case of discrimination.40 Once that showing has been
made, the burden shifts back to the State to provide a neutral explanation
for the challenges.41 The court must then evaluate the explanation to
determine if there has been purposeful discrimination.42 Note that this
burden shifting approach does not preclude the use of peremptory
challenges that seem racially motivated, so long as the challenging party
can show a race neutral reasoning for the challenge that satisfies the court.
Since 1986, the Supreme Court has issued a series of decisions that have
broadened the scope of Batson v. Kentucky. In Powers v. Ohio, the Court
held that a defendant could object to racially motivated peremptory
challenges even when the defendant and the challenged juror were of
different races.43 Additionally, Powers is significant in that the Court, for
the first time, considered the equal protection rights of the excluded juror
(i.e., every citizen’s right to be eligible for jury service) rather than the
rights of the defendant.44
[14] In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., the Court considered whether
Batson should apply to civil actions as well as criminal cases.45 In this
case, a black construction worker brought a negligence action for injuries
in a job-site accident. Counsel for Leesville Concrete exercised two of
their three peremptory strikes to exclude blacks from the jury.46 The
38

Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
Id.
40
Id. at 97.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 98.
43
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991).
44
Id. at 414.
45
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616-17 (1991).
46
Id. at 617.
39
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Supreme Court expanded the holding in Batson to include civil cases,
noting that racial discrimination in a civil case “harms the excluded juror
no less than discrimination in a criminal trial.”47
[15] The Supreme Court next looked to peremptory challenges that, while
facially neutral, had a disparate impact upon certain racial groups. In
Hernandez v. New York, a juror was challenged on the basis of his ability
to speak Spanish in a case where some of the witnesses were expected to
testify in Spanish, given the juror’s conceded reluctance to accept only the
interpreter’s version of the testimony.48 In a plurality opinion, Justice
Kennedy noted that, unless discriminatory intent is inherent in the
challenger’s actions, the reasoning offered will be deemed race neutral.49
Justice O’Connor concurred and went even farther, stating that the reason
for the challenge must not be the juror’s race itself, but for matters related
to the juror’s race (e.g., fluency in Spanish as in Hernandez).50
[16] The Batson decision regarding race was revisited by the Court in
Georgia v. McCollum.51 Here, the Court further expanded Batson to
prohibit the use of racially motivated challenges by criminal defendants
(thus placing defense counsel under the same restrictions as prosecutors).52
Even after McCollum, the issue of gender-based discrimination remained.
Attempts to apply Batson analysis to gender discrimination were initially
unsuccessful. For example, in United States v. Hamilton, a defense
attorney cited Batson in his claim that the prosecution’s challenges of three
potential jurors were racially motivated (since all three were AfricanAmerican).53 The prosecutor countered that race was not the reason –
instead, he struck the jurors because they were women.54 The trial court
held that there were no constitutional difficulties so long as the reasons for
striking the jurors were racially neutral.55 On appeal the Fourth Circuit

47

Id. at 619.
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
49
Id. at 360.
50
Id. at 375.
51
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 47 (1992).
52
Id. at 59.
53
United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038, 1040 (4th Cir. 1988).
54
Id. at 1041.
55
Id. at 1040.
48
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agreed, finding that neither the Sixth Amendment nor the Equal Protection
Clause prohibited gender-based peremptory challenges.56
[17] Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court seized the opportunity to
address the issue of gender-based peremptory challenges in J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel T.B..57 In J.E.B., a father challenged the state’s use of
peremptory challenges to exclude men from juries in paternity actions.58
Though the Court had traditionally evaluated gender-based discrimination
with a lesser degree of scrutiny than race-based discrimination,59 it held in
J.E.B. that gender-based peremptory challenges were constitutionally
prohibited as well.60
[18] The Court based its decisions in Batson and its progeny on the rights
of both litigants and prospective jurors under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Defendants, however, have an additional Sixth Amendment right to select
a jury from a pool of citizens that represents a fair cross-section of the
community.61 In determining what constitutes a fair cross-section, courts
56

Id. at 1043.
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 128-29 (1994).
58
Id. at 129.
59
Jere W. Morehead, When A Peremptory Challenge is no Longer Peremptory: Batson’s
Unfortunate Failure to Eradicate Invidious Discrimination from Jury Selection, 43
DEPAUL L. REV. 625, 633 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding genderbased classifications receive a lesser degree of scrutiny than do those based on race)).
See also Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (holding
an important governmental objective is sufficient reason for gender discrimination).
60
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 141-42. See also Swift, supra note 31 at 338. The J.E.B. Court did
not go so far as to equate gender-based challenges with race-based challenges; instead,
the difference in philosophy between these types of challenges is best described as
follows:
The J.E.B. Court thus simply declared, without any doctrinal support, a
principle of jury selection/equal protection doctrine: challenges based
on assumptions of group thinking among groups typically or
traditionally
subject
to
stereotyping
are
unconstitutional
notwithstanding the body of doctrine holding that the justification for
gender discrimination need not rise to the level of importance as that
offered for racial discrimination; challenges based on arbitrary and
capricious judgments about group thinking with regard to all other
classifications are valid notwithstanding the body of doctrine holding
that governmental classifications may never be arbitrary. Id.
61
United States v. Grisham, 63 F.3d 1074, 1078 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S.
1084 (1996); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2001) (“[Parties] have the right to grand and
57
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have typically limited the right to “cognizable groups” (i.e., groups that are
already protected to a greater degree under the Equal Protection Clause).62
To summarize, the Sixth Amendment provides that the venire must be a
fair cross-section of the community, while the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees both defendants and jurors that discriminatory practices will
not be permitted when selecting jurors from the venire. This distinction
will be particularly important when the Court’s decision in Purkett v.
Elem63 is explored later in this article.
[19] In the future, it is likely that the Court will be presented with further
opportunities to broaden the Batson decision by deciding that “cognizable
group” status be extended to religious affiliation,64 age,65 level of
education,66 physical handicap,67 and other distinguishing characteristics
petit juries selected at random from a fair cross section of the community in the district or
division wherein the court convenes”); see also Andrew W. Leopold, Constitutionalizing
Jury Selection in Criminal Cases: A Critical Evaluation, 86 GEO. L.J. 945, 949 (1998)
(citing Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480 (1990)) [hereinafter Leopold]; Id. at n. 16
(quoting Grisham, 63 F.3d at 1079-80 (“The ‘community’ from which the potential jurors
are drawn can be as broad as the judicial district in which the crime occurred.”)).
62
Leopold, supra note 61, at 967-69.
63
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995).
64
See United States v. Gelb, 881 F.2d 1155, 1161 (2d Cir. 1989) (determining that Jews
were a cognizable group for the purpose of Sixth Amendment protection of their right to
representation in the venire). But see also Grech v. Wainwright, 492 F.2d 747, 750 n.3
(5th Cir. 1974) (requiring proof that the Jewish population was substantial enough in the
community before acknowledging that Jews were a cognizable group. The proof was not
critical, however, as the judge had merely provided Jewish veniremen with the option to
exclude themselves from jury duty to observe Yom Kippur; the judge had not
purposefully excluded all Jews from the venire).
65
Efforts to have particular sectors of the population defined as cognizable groups based
on age have thus far been unsuccessful. See Willis v. Kemp, 838 F.2d 1510, 1516-17
(11th Cir. 1988) (stating that in a murder trial, the defendant alleged that persons age 18
to 29 were a cognizable group for Sixth Amendment cross-section claim purposes); State
v. Blunt, 708 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985) (stating that in a murder trial, the
defendant alleged that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated by the granting of
exemptions from jury service for members of the venire that were over 65 and desired
such exemption). One group of people over the age of 65 did succeed in State v.
Williams, 342 So.2d 1325, 1326 (Ala. App. 1976) (holding persons over 65 were
systematically excluded from the venire without providing them with the opportunity to
serve).
66
See United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901, 905 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that in a
marijuana importation case, neither persons 18-34 nor persons whose education was
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for the purpose of asserting the defendant’s (and prospective juror’s) Sixth
Amendment rights.
B. USE OF PUBLIC OPINION POLLS IN JURY SELECTION
[20] As public opinion survey technology has improved, and polls have
become more generally accepted, the courts have become more receptive
to their use in trials. Although as late as the 1950’s, courts were generally
dubious about the usefulness of surveys; in recent years, courts have been
more receptive to the use of polling results in the courtroom.
[21] Historically, public opinion survey evidence was subject to exclusion
because it is, by its very nature, hearsay. In 1953, for example, the Florida
Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s exclusion of a poll that showed that
a black defendant accused of raping a white woman could not get a fair
trial in the county where the crime allegedly occurred.68 This decision
greatly diminished the potential for use of polling data in trials, as
proponents were forced in some cases to parade dozens of interviewers
and respondents to the witness stand in order to overcome the inevitable
hearsay objections.69
[22] Introduction of survey evidence through the testimony of the
participants was indeed cumbersome. Recognizing this, one court took a
significant step toward allowing admission of polling evidence in Zippo
Manufacturing Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc.70 There, the manufacturer of a
popular cigarette lighter sued an importer for trademark infringement and
limited to high school or below qualified as a cognizable group for jury selection
purposes).
67
See State v. Spivey, 700 S.W.2d 812, 814 (Mo. 1985) (holding, in a trial in which a
deaf defendant was accused of murder, that since deafness can occur to persons in all
walks of life, the defendant’s right to a fair trial was not impaired by a jury pool that had
no deaf members).
68
Irvin v. State, 66 So.2d 288, 291 (Fla. 1953) (en banc). The defendant in this case
attempted to introduce the survey results into evidence through the testimony of the
polling company executive who supervised the survey. Because the executive had not
actually conducted the polling himself, the court excluded his testimony as “hearsay upon
hearsay.” Id.
69
Standard Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 252 F.2d 65, 75 (10th Cir. 1958). See also
Quaker Oats Co. v. General Mills, Inc., 134 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1943).
70
Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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unfair competition.71 In order to prove their claim, Zippo attempted to
introduce the results of surveys that showed respondents were so confused
by the appearance of Rogers’ lighters that they mistakenly identified them
as “Zippo” lighters.72 The court, while admitting that survey evidence was
hearsay, allowed it nevertheless and stated:
Regardless of whether the surveys in this case could be
admitted under the non-hearsay approach, they are
admissible because the answers of respondents are
expressions of presently existing state of mind, attitude, or
belief. There is a recognized exception to the hearsay rule
for such statements, and under it the statements are
admissible to prove the truth of the matter contained
therein.73
[23] Thus, the procedural obstacles regarding admissibility of survey
evidence have been significantly reduced. Recently, recognition of the
validity of survey evidence was demonstrated in Schering Corp. v. Pfizer
Inc.74 There the court discussed the history of excluding survey evidence75
in a case alleging false advertising in violation of a prior settlement
agreement between the parties,76 and held that the weight granted to
survey evidence should be based on whether:
1) the “universe” was properly defined, (2) a representative
sample of that universe was selected, (3) the questions to be
asked of interviewees were framed in a clear, precise and
non-leading manner, (4) sound interview procedures were
followed by competent interviewers who had no knowledge
of the litigation or the purpose for which the survey was
conducted, (5) the data gathered was accurately reported,
(6) the data was analyzed in accordance with accepted
71

Id.
Id. at 680-81.
73
Id. at 683.
74
Schering Corp. v. Pfizer Inc., 189 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 1999).
75
Id. at 224. See generally DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods., 6 F. Supp. 859,
884-85 (E.D.N.Y. 1934); Elgin Nat’l Watch Co. v. Elgin Clock Co., 26 F.2d 376, 376-77
(D. Del. 1928).
76
Schering Corp., 189 F.3d at 221.
72
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statistical principles and (7) the objectivity of the entire
process was ensured.77
[24] Today, survey evidence is generally accepted under certain
conditions. For example, in Liberty Financial Management Corp. v.
Beneficial Data Processing Corp., an employee survey was entered into
evidence in a breach of contract lawsuit.78 The lawsuit concerned the
implementation of a computer system that ultimately proved faulty.79 The
plaintiff, Liberty, entered into evidence the results of a survey of its
employees.80 The survey was conducted to determine how much time
employees spent on computer problems both before and after the
implementation of the faulty system.81 In ruling on the survey’s
admissibility, the court stated:
[W]e recognize that statistically reliable surveys are an
accepted tool used regularly in formulating highly
sophisticated business decisions. They are an accepted
method of determining truth as perceived through the
collective judgment of enormous segments of the
population. Given the verity that surveys are accorded in
everyday life, we see no reason to exclude them from the
consideration of the trier of fact in a complex case such as
the one at hand.82
[25] Survey evidence has been admitted as relevant to a variety of issues
such as ruling on the constitutionality of federal statutes83 and
contradicting poor election results to show a favorable reputation among

77

Id. at 225.
Liberty Fin. Mgmt. Corp. v. Beneficial Data Processing Corp., 670 S.W.2d 40, 44 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1984).
79
Id. at 46.
80
Id. at 53.
81
Id.
82
Id at 55.
83
Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 473-75 (1987). A United States citizen appealed a
decision that classified films he was showing as “political propaganda.” The appellee
(Keene) introduced the results of a Gallup poll that showed that the public would be less
inclined to vote for him if the films were classified as such.
78
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colleagues.84 It is important to note, however, that the use of polling data
as evidence is still subject to the same scrutiny as other forms of expert
testimony and standards of documentation.85
C. USE OF JURY QUESTIONNAIRES IN JURY SELECTION
[26] Questionnaires have been used in the courtroom for at least forty
years. Written questionnaires are often provided to prospective jurors to
quicken the subsequent voir dire and to provide a forum for asking delicate
questions that members of the venire are unlikely to be comfortable
answering in a courtroom setting in the presence of others.86 Silliphant v.
Sheriff of New York, decided in 1959, is one of the earliest instances in
which a court ruled on the use of questionnaires.87 The questionnaire in
that case was not being used for jury selection; instead, it was being used
by a grand jury as a supplement for grand jury testimony.88 The court
concluded that witnesses could be compelled to answer questionnaires
being utilized as a supplement for grand jury testimony.89
[27] The court in People v. Carter considered whether the use of
questionnaires was discriminatory in an appeal of a conviction for the
murder of a California highway patrolman.90 The jury commissioner in
this case routinely sent 2,500 jury questionnaires each year to randomly
selected persons chosen from registered voter lists and local telephone
directories.91 The questionnaires did not inquire as to the racial
classification of the respondents, and the jury commissioner did not
conduct interviews with the respondents and therefore did not have visual
84

Ollman v. Evans, 713 F.2d 838, 851-52 (D.C. Cir. 1983), aff’d on rehearing, 750 F.2d
970 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
85
Robert G. Sugarman & Nancy S. Scherer, The Use of Experts and Survey Evidence in
Copyright, Trademark and Unfair Competition Litigation, 395 PLI/PAT 413, 428 (Oct.
1994). Generally, survey evidence must provide in discovery detailed records of the
vendor’s methods and practices and is subject to cross-examination on these practices
once the evidence has been introduced.
86
See Matthew L. Larrabee & Linda P. Drucker, Adieu Voir Dire: The Jury
Questionnaire, 21 NO. 1 LITIG. 37 (1994).
87
Silliphant v. Sheriff of New York, 160 N.E.2d 890, 891 (N.Y. 1959).
88
Id. at 890.
89
Id. at 892.
90
People v. Carter, 364 P.2d 477, 479 (Cal. 1961).
91
Id. at 489.
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notice of race.92 The defendant claimed that the use of questionnaires for
jury selection excluded “persons with the same racial, economic, social,
and geographic background as the defendant.”93 However, the defendant
lacked facts to support his contention that the questionnaires were mailed
unfairly, while the jury commissioner’s affidavit described the methods
employed to distribute the questionnaires.94 The court held there was
neither evidence of discriminatory intent on the part of the state, nor
evidence that the empanelled jury was not a representative cross-section of
the community.95
[28] A similar complaint of discrimination regarding the use of
questionnaires met with an equally disdainful response in United States v.
Hoffa.96 There, the defendant, Jimmy Hoffa, claimed that the jury panel
assembled with the aid of jury questionnaires was not ethnically
representative of the community.97 His claim was dismissed with little
discussion, since there were no ethnic questions included in the
questionnaire and the defendant’s complaint was based merely on the
visual inspection of the jury panel immediately prior to voir dire.98
[29] In recent years, the use of jury questionnaires has become
commonplace.99 In fact, Cathy E. Bennett, a leading jury and trial
consultant, has written that her “experience has shown that the advantages
of a questionnaire dramatically outweigh any and all disadvantages.”100
These disadvantages affect both sides of the aisle in criminal proceedings.
Some defense lawyers resist the use of jury questionnaires for fear that the
92

Id.
Id.
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Id.
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United States v. Hoffa, 235 F. Supp. 611, 615 (E.D. Tenn. 1964).
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Id. at 613.
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Id.
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The use of jury questionnaires has been the subject of numerous articles and notes in
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answers contained therein will identify and expose a juror with atypical
attitudes that might create a hung jury if seated.101 Alternatively,
prosecutors worry that the use of a questionnaire might similarly expose
jurors who are pro-law enforcement.102
[30] It is important to note that these same concerns exist where no
questionnaire is used at all, because oral voir dire can just as easily expose
the juror predispositions outlined above. The court, however, usually
places stringent restrictions on voir dire.103 Often, attorneys cannot even
question the panel; judges control the voir dire process and do all of the
questioning.104 Even if attorneys are allowed to actively participate, there
are usually strict limitations on time and question content.105 The use of
questionnaires makes it more likely that relevant attitudes will be
discovered, since many more questions can be asked in a questionnaire
than can be asked in the compressed timeframe offered by oral voir dire.106
Moreover, the use of a questionnaire eliminates the possibility that the
jurors that remain will harbor ill will toward an attorney, or the judge, for
asking probative and delicate questions because in a questionnaire jurors
are unaware which of the parties proposed the question.107
[31] An important consideration involves where to draw the line on venire
questioning. How much information is too much? Some attorneys, and
some judges as well, subscribe to the “any 12 in the box” theory, which
provides that nearly any venireman is an appropriate juror, so long as she
believes that she can consider the case fairly.108 At the opposite end of the
spectrum are those attorneys who feel that jurors are substantially affected
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Id.
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See Beverly Petersen Jennison, Trial Court Discretion in Conducting the Voir Dire
Subjected to More Stringent Scrutiny: Cordero v. United States, 33 CATH. U. L. REV.
1121, 1134 (1984).
104
See Valerie P. Hans & Alayna Jehle, Avoid Bald Men and People With Green Socks?
Other Ways to Improve the Voir Dire Process in Jury Selection, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1179, 1183-84 (2003).
105
Jennison, supra note 103, at 1123.
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Larabee, supra note 86, at 662.
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See Lin S. Lilley, Let Jurors Speak the Truth, in Writing, 41 TRIAL 64, 65-66 (2005).
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See Abbe Smith, Nice Work if You Can Get It: “Ethical” Jury Selection in Criminal
Defense, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 523, 525 (1998).
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in deliberations by their life experiences and social attitudes.109 It is safe
to presume, with the ever increasing use of questionnaires and opinion
surveys, that today’s litigator will inevitably be placed in a position where
he or she will need to understand how best to use these new jury selection
tools.
III. ANALYSIS
[32] There is a substantial danger, given the Court’s holdings in Batson
and its progeny, that parties will develop voir dire or jury questionnaire
questions that merely serve as a subterfuge for their true intent –
discrimination on the basis of race or gender. The analysis which follows
examines recent decisions providing counsel great latitude during voir
dire. In order to honor the fundamental premise of the Batson decision, it
is important to develop a procedure employing public opinion polling and
jury questionnaires to help the trial court discern when a question has the
potential for being used with discriminatory intent. This article proposes a
procedure, the “Z-Test,” which will provide the trial court with a method
to differentiate between questions asked with discriminatory intent and
questions that may have a legitimate role in voir dire.
A. PUBLIC OPINION POLLS VS. JURY QUESTIONNAIRES
[33] In order to determine whether any proposed question is potentially
discriminatory, the court must consider whether responses to the question
are closely associated with certain racial, ethnic, or gender groups.110 To
perform this assessment, the court must first decide whether the use of a
public opinion poll or a jury questionnaire is most appropriate.111 The key
factor in making this determination involves the size of the sample (in this
109

See Larabee, supra note 86, at 37-38.
See J. Vincent Aprile II, More Extensive Voir Dire: A Supreme Court Mandate?, 9
CRIM. JUST. 43, 45 (1994).
111
For clarity, it is important to define the meaning of “public opinion polls” and “jury
questionnaires.” For purposes of this note, public opinion polls will be considered to be
the interviewing of citizens outside the venire. Jury questionnaires, on the other hand,
will refer to those instruments distributed to the venire, and collected back from the
veniremen, prior to voir dire to streamline the jury selection process. See Joseph F. Flynn,
Prejudicial Publicity in Criminal Trials: Bringing Sheppard v. Maxwell into the Nineties,
27 NEW ENG. L. REV. 857, 875 (1993).
110

17

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIII, Issue 2

case, the venire). Public opinion polls typically strive to collect at least
400 responses in order to achieve a confidence level of 95 percent that the
results will be within “plus or minus” 5 percent of the true opinion on any
issue. Thus, any meaningful results from a jury questionnaire used to
gauge public opinion would require at least 400 responses.
[34] Does this mean that the venire must be at least 400 members?
Absolutely not. Instead, this only requires that at least 400 completed
questionnaires be returned to the jury administrator. Thus, a jury
administrator could send the questionnaires to all potential jurors for a
variety of cases, compiling the results for use in the case proposing the
potentially discriminatory question. Sophisticated jury panel managers
could even archive the poll results for future use when similar questions
are evaluated for their potential discriminatory effect.
[35] Public opinion polling remains an option, albeit an expensive one, to
determine the likelihood of discriminatory effect of a voir dire question. If
the polling option is employed, perhaps at the expense of the party
wanting to use the suspect question, polling firms can typically return
results in a matter of days.
[36] Regardless of the method chosen, results of the poll or questionnaires
must be compiled and cross-tabulated to report the answers to questions by
racial and gender responses. These results would then be used as the basis
for application of the Z-Test.
B. WHEN DO APPARENTLY VALID QUESTIONS BECOME A
PRETEXT FOR DISCRIMINATION?
[37] Invariably, a party will ask a question during voir dire that is neutral
on its face, but in reality, offers an opportunity to be used for a
discriminatory purpose or has an unintended discriminatory effect. If that
party uses the answer to that question as a basis for exercise of a
peremptory strike, opposing counsel may exercise a Batson challenge to
protest the use of a presumably discriminatory challenge.
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[38] Batson analysis requires that the challenging party provide the court
with a “neutral explanation” for the use of the peremptory challenge.112
The Supreme Court clarified the definition of “neutral explanation” with
its holding in Purkett v. Elem.113 The defendant in this case, a black male,
was convicted of robbery in Missouri.114 Defendant’s counsel objected,
citing Batson, to the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges excluding
two black males from the jury.115 The prosecutor contended that his
reason for striking the black male jurors was because they had facial
hair.116 The defendant appealed with no success, until his case reached the
Eighth Circuit. There, the court held that the prosecutor’s explanation was
pretextual and that the trial court had committed clear error by not finding
that the challenges were discriminatory.117 The Supreme Court reversed
the Eighth Circuit, finding that a legitimate reason for a challenge under
Batson was “not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny
equal protection.”118
[39] At least one court decided that Batson’s original approach to the
determination of pretextual discrimination is preferable to the Court’s
application of Batson in Purkett. In People v. Jamison, a California
appellate court openly disagreed with Purkett, calling it a “digression from
prior federal law” that would reduce motions alleging discrimination via
peremptory challenge to “nothing more than an empty gesture.”119 At this
point, it is unclear whether litigants relying on Batson’s three-step burdenshifting analysis regarding peremptory challenges are limited by Purkett’s
holding that even the most ridiculous reasons for challenge are appropriate
so long as they are facially neutral.
[40] Based on the Court’s holding in Purkett, trial courts are now forced to
deal with what one court in Illinois has called a “charade:”
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[W]e now consider the charade that has become the Batson
process. The State may provide the trial court with a series
of pat race-neutral reasons for exercise of peremptory
challenges. Since reviewing courts examine only the
record, we wonder if the reasons can be given without a
smile. Surely, new prosecutors are given a manual,
probably entitled, “Handy Race-Neutral Explanations” or
“20 Time-Tested Race-Neutral Explanations.” It might
include: too old, too young, divorced, “long, unkempt hair,”
free-lance writer, religion, social worker, renter, lack of
family contact, attempting to make eye contact with the
defendant, “lived in an area consisting predominantly of
apartment complexes,” single, over-educated, lack of
maturity, improper demeanor, unemployed, improper attire,
juror lived alone, misspelled place of employment, living
with girlfriend, unemployed spouse, spouse employed as
school teacher, employment as part-time barber, friendship
with city council member, failure to remove hat, lack of
community ties, children same “age bracket” as defendant,
deceased father and prospective juror’s aunt receiving
psychiatric care.120
[41] Despite the judge’s humorous interpretation of the Purkett ruling,
each of the above reasons would actually survive a Batson challenge under
Purkett. It is likely that such broad latitude was granted by the Court, in
part because there was no test apparent to them that would more readily
identify pretextual jury challenges. This article presents a workable test to
address this problem, inspired by the burden-shifting framework
established in Batson.

120

People v. Randall, 671 N.E.2d 60, 65-66 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (citing examples from
various Illinois cases). This stinging commentary was delivered in reversing a conviction
following the prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge to strike a black prospective
juror, justified on the ground that the venireman was a high school principal and that
people that work with students are “much more forgiving.” Id. at 68.
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C. A PROPOSED TEST FOR DIFFERENTIATING DISCRIMINATION IN VOIR DIRE
FROM ZEALOUS ADVOCACY
[42] The first challenge in implementing the test is determining the extent
to which it will be applied. It is easy to see that such a test would be
useful in cases of purposeful discrimination. But what about situations
where the discrimination is not intentional, but present nevertheless?
[43] In Washington v. Davis, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that
the standard for identifying invidious discrimination prohibited by the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was the same as
the standard applied under Title VII.121 In Davis, black applicants seeking
jobs as police officers in the District of Columbia claimed that written tests
required by the department were discriminatory.122 Under Title VII, the
mere presence of disparate impact is sometimes enough to show that
discrimination is present.123 In Davis, however, the Court held that the
“purpose to discriminate” was a critical element in determining whether
discrimination constituted an equal protection violation.124 Interestingly,
the Davis decision carved out a special exception for jury selection
cases.125 The Court held that racial discrimination in jury selection
excluded blacks was such an “unequal application of the law as to show
The Court held that in cases of
intentional discrimination.”126
discrimination related to jury selection traditional disparate impact
analysis (similar to Title VII cases), in which the burden shifts to the
challenging party to rebut the presumption of discrimination, is
appropriate.127
[44] This decision seems to be in tension with the Court’s subsequent
decision in Purkett. Purkett placed the burden on the party alleging the
discriminatory use of a challenge to demonstrate that the reasoning for a
121
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peremptory strike was not race-neutral.128 The test proposed in this article,
the Z-Test, offers a mechanism for both parties to determine whether a
question that is plausibly neutral is, in fact, discriminatory.
[45] To apply the Z-Test, the court or one of the parties must have posed
the potentially discriminatory question to a suitable sample (at least 400
respondents) of either citizens qualified for jury service (via public opinion
poll), or the prospective jurors themselves (via jury questionnaire). The
results must be compiled and cross-tabulated by race and gender. These
results should then be analyzed according to the following test:
[46] All questions offered for voir dire or jury questionnaires are subject to
a burden-shifting analysis for discriminatory effect. The opponent to a
question has the initial burden. The opponent must demonstrate that the
challenged question isolates the members of a classification to the degree
that it is a 98% statistical certainty that such isolation is not due to random
error.
If successful, the question will be considered potentially
discriminatory. The burden then shifts to the party offering the question to
demonstrate that its significance and importance to the matter at hand
substantially exceeds any discriminatory impact. Once both parties have
offered their evidence and reasoning, the court makes a determination as to
whether strikes based on the answer to the proffered question should be
permitted. The court might also find the evidence so compelling as to
justify the excusing of jurors for cause based on the answer to a specific
question. Admittedly, the 98% threshold outlined in the Z-Test is
somewhat arbitrary. As a general rule, the classifications of those offering
a specific response to a given question are distributed along a bell curve
wherein the majority of all respondents are clustered closest to the mean.
By adopting a 98% significance threshold for the Z-Test, classifications
that are clustered in the upper 1% or lower 1% of the bell curve are
presumed to indicate deviance from the mean with a 98% certainty.129

128

Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 ,767 (1995).
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D. PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE Z-TEST TO DETECT
DISCRIMINATORY QUESTIONS
[47] To illustrate, Magellan Research conducted a survey of 408 potential
jurors in Clark County, Nevada.130 Respondents were asked a series of
demographic questions to identify each according to gender, ethnic origin,
education, and other factors. Next, each respondent was presented with a
set of indicator statements. For each statement the respondent indicated
whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement. Last, each
respondent was asked a series of background questions in which he
provided information regarding previous jury service, termination from
employment, etc.
[48] Once this information was collected, it was cross-tabulated to display
the responses to each indicator and background question by demographic
trait. The Z-Test for percentages was then used to compare the overall
results with each demographic trait to determine which demographic traits
substantially deviated from the mean. The Z-Test identified demographic
traits whose deviation from the mean exceeded the 98% significance
threshold (i.e. the deviation was 98% or more certain to be a valid
difference, not a random error). Thus, the Z-Test identified any question
that could potentially result in a prospective juror with that demographic
trait being discriminated against if the answer to the question was used as
the basis for a peremptory challenge.
[49] For the purposes of analyzing the polling results, the demographic
traits analyzed in this survey can be classified in three groups. The first
group (Protected Classes) includes demographic traits that have been
found by the Supreme Court to be improper for use in exercising
peremptory challenges—namely, gender and race. The second group
(Suspect Classes) is comprised of demographic traits which, although not
yet considered by the Supreme Court, would likely be considered by most
courts as improper for use as a basis for peremptory strike based on public
policy. These traits are income, marital status, age, education, and
religious preference. The third group (Other Classes) is comprised of
traits that would provide insight into jury selection, but arguably fall short
130

To view the detailed statistical tables used for the conclusions drawn in this paper, see
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of qualifying as traits which should not be used based on public policy
concerns. These traits are number of children living at home, length of
residence in the county, job type, and industry.
1. PROTECTED CLASSES
[50] The following table illustrates the questions and responses which the
Z-Test has identified as discriminatory based on gender.
Table 1.1 - Gender
Question

Response

People should be allowed to own handguns for
personal protection.
Women who kill abusive husbands should be treated
the same as other criminals.
Have you ever owned a handgun?

Agree
Disagree
Agree
Disagree
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No

Have you or someone in your household ever been
arrested?
Have you ever witnessed a criminal act of violence?
Have you ever been fired or laid off from a job?

Discriminates
Against
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female

[51] To illustrate how the preceding table is interpreted, note that
exercising a peremptory strike on prospective jurors who own a handgun,
unfairly discriminates against men, while striking those in the venire who
never owned a handgun unfairly excludes women. These results are
hardly surprising and tend to reinforce many existing perceptions
regarding the differences between men and women.
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[52] Similarly, the next table displays those questions that result in racial
or ethnic discrimination.
Table 1.2 - Ethnic
Question

Response

A person charged with murder should have to testify
at trial.

Agree
Disagree

O.J. Simpson was guilty even though he was acquitted
in his criminal trial.
Defense attorneys will say or do just about anything
to get an acquittal.
Bill Clinton should be judged by his Presidency, not
his sex life.

Agree
Disagree
Agree
Disagree
Agree
Disagree

Marijuana is no worse than alcohol and cigarettes and
should be legalized.

Agree

Women who kill abusive husbands should be treated
the same as other criminals.

It is impossible to get a fair trial in this county.

Disagree
Agree
Disagree

Parents should be held criminally liable for illegal acts
of their teenage children.

Agree
Disagree
Agree
Disagree

Have you ever owned a handgun?

Yes

Do you or someone in your household own a gun of
any kind?
Has someone in your household ever worked for an
attorney, judge or court?
Have you ever served on a criminal jury?
Have you ever served on a civil jury?
Have you ever served on a grand jury?
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No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No

Discriminates
Against
Hispanic
Asian/Pac Isl
Caucasian
Afr Amer
Other
Caucasian
Afr Amer
Hispanic
Other
Afr Amer
Caucasian
Hispanic
Caucasian
Afr Amer
Hispanic
Hispanic
Caucasian
Afr Amer
Other
Afr Amer
Caucasian
Hispanic
Caucasian
Afr Amer
Caucasian
Afr Amer
Hispanic
Caucasian
Afr Amer
Other
Hispanic
Other
Asian/Pac Isl
Asian/Pac Isl
Hispanic
Asian/Pac Isl
Other
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[53] An interesting observation regarding ethnic bias and jury selection in
Clark County is that the data shows that often it is Hispanics, not African
Americans, who are likely to be discriminated against in jury selection if
stricken based on the response to a voir dire question. While African
Americans are still susceptible to discriminatory effect–note the O.J.
Simpson and fair trial questions—Hispanics appear to be far more likely to
be the victims of discriminatory impact during voir dire.
[54] One other area in which there is a remarkably clear discriminatory
effect involves prior jury service. Asian American/Pacific Islanders are
unfairly excluded if challenges are used to exclude those that have never
served on a jury before. The data also demonstrates that exclusion based
on lack of previous grand jury service excludes all but Caucasians and
African Americans.
2. SUSPECT CLASSES
Question

Table 2.1 – Household Income
Response

A person charged with murder should have to testify at
trial.

Disagree

Bill Clinton should be judged by his Presidency, not his
sex life.
Large corporations never pay their fair share in lawsuits.

Agree
Disagree
Agree

Do you or someone in your household own a gun of any
kind?
Have you or someone in your household ever been
arrested?
Has someone in your household ever worked for an
attorney, judge or court?

Disagree
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No

Have you ever served on a grand jury?
Have you ever been fired or laid off from a job?

No
Yes
No

Have you or someone in your household ever worked in
law enforcement?
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Yes
No

Discriminates
Against
35 to 60K
60 to 100K
Over 100K
Under 20K
20 to 35K
Under 20K
20 to 35K
35 to 60K
Over 100K
Over 100K
Under 20K
Under 20K
Over 100K
35 to 60K
Under 20K
20 to 35K
60 to 100K
Under 20K
20 to 35K
60 to 100K
Over 100K
35 to 60K
Under 20K
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Table 2.2 – Marital Status
Question

Response

Marijuana is no worse than alcohol and cigarettes and
should be legalized.
Do you or someone in your household own a gun of
any kind?

Agree
Disagree
Yes
No

Have you ever served on a grand jury?

No

Discriminates
Against
Live w/Other
Married
Married
Single
Live w/Other
Live w/Other

Table 2.3 – Age
Question

Response

A person charged with murder should have to testify
at trial.

Agree
Disagree

Women who kill abusive husbands should be treated
the same as other criminals.
It is impossible to get a fair trial in this county.
Have you or someone in your household ever been
arrested?
Have you ever witnessed a criminal act of violence?

Agree
Disagree
Agree
Disagree
Yes
No
Yes
No

Have you ever served on a criminal jury?

Yes
No
Yes
No

Have you ever served on a civil jury?
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Discriminates
Against
18 to 25
26 to 35
46 to 55
Over 55
26 to 35
46 to 55
46 to 55
18 to 25
18 to 25
Over 55
18 to 25
36 to 45
46 to 55
Over 55
Over 55
Under 56
Over 55
Under 56
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Table 2.4 – Education
Question

Response

A person charged with murder should have to testify
at trial.

Agree

O.J. Simpson was guilty even though he was acquitted
in his criminal trial.
Large corporations never pay their fair share in
lawsuits.
Women who kill abusive husbands should be treated
the same as other criminals.
Has someone in your household ever worked for an
attorney, judge or court?

Disagree
Disagree
Agree
Disagree
Agree
Disagree
Yes

Have you ever served on a grand jury?

No
No

Have you ever been fired or laid off from a job?

Yes

Have you or someone in your household ever worked
in law enforcement?

No
Yes
No

Discriminates
Against
Non HS Grad
HS Grad
Coll
Jr Coll
Non HS Grad
Jr Coll
Coll
HS Grad
Post Grad
Coll
Post Grad
HS Grad
Non HS Grad
Post Grad
HS Grad
Jr Coll
Post Grad
Jr Coll
Non HS Grad
HS Grad

Table 2.5 – Religion
Question

Response

People should be allowed to own handguns for
personal protection.

Agree

O.J. Simpson was guilty even though he was acquitted
in his criminal trial.

Disagree
Agree

Bill Clinton should be judged by his Presidency, not
his sex life.

Disagree
Agree
Disagree

Prosecutors will try to convict a defendant even if
they’re unsure if he’s guilty.

Agree
Disagree

Do you or someone in your household own a gun of
any kind?

Yes
No
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Discriminates
Against
Protestant
Other
Jewish
Catholic
None
Other
Jewish
Protestant
Catholic
Other
None
Protestant
Other
Other
Jewish
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Have you or someone in your household ever sued
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Yes
No
Yes
No

Jewish
None
Jewish
None

[55] There are several noteworthy aspects to the data regarding “Suspect
Classes.” First, there are several questions which could be used to exclude
upper-income jurors, senior citizens, and Jewish citizens. Second, there
seems to be a fairly clear distinction between respondents with advanced
educations and those who do not possess college degrees. Last, it is
interesting to note that few questions have a discriminatory impact with
respect to marital status.
3. OTHER CLASSES
[56] The third group, referred to in this article as “Other Classes,” does not
indicate any substantial danger of discriminatory impact based on number
of children, length of residence, job, or industry. While the Z-Test
identifies some segments which would be potentially singled out—
particularly in the employment categories—the data implying
discriminatory effects may be somewhat attributable to the limited
sampling of the poll and the high number of categories (eight each) that
are used for classification.
[57] It is important to note that Clark County, Nevada, is rather unique in
several respects. First, with one notable exception, Clark County permits
most forms of gambling.131 Second, it has grown at a tremendous rate
over the last twenty years.132 Thus, its citizens are predominantly people
who have relocated from other areas. These differences are noted to
illustrate that the findings presented in this article are applicable only to
Clark County. Additional polling should be performed independently in
other jurisdictions to conduct similar analysis.

131

See About Clark County,
http://www.co.clark.nv.us/public_communications/About_clark_county.htm (last visited
Oct. 11, 2006).
132
Id. (“Clark County is one of the fastest-growing areas in the country, with more than
5,000 people moving here each month”).
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[58] A potential obstacle for the Z-Test, or any Batson analysis for that
matter, occurs when a question both violates the 98% threshold and is
substantively applicable to the case at hand. Take the “Have you ever
been a victim of a violent crime?” question, for example. In most cases,
this question would be excluded because it could, perhaps unfairly, be
used to exclude significant numbers of women from the jury. Yet this
information would be vital to both defense and prosecution alike in a
sexual assault trial.
[59] To overcome this important dilemma, courts employing the Z-Test
should apply a burden-shifting framework similar to that advocated by
Batson.133 First, the party who wishes to exclude a question from voir dire
bears the burden of using the Z-Test to demonstrate its discriminatory
effect. Opposing counsel would then be afforded an opportunity to present
arguments on why the probative value of the responses to the proffered
question substantially outweighs any discriminatory impact. The trial
court would then rule on the use of the question in a manner similar to
rulings on the admissibility of evidence.134 Unless the probative value
substantially outweighs the discriminatory impact, the question should be
excluded from voir dire and peremptory challenges based on response to
the question (if asked in a preliminary jury questionnaire) should not be
permitted.
[60] There are some obvious shortcomings to the Z-Test. Foremost among
these is the requirement that a jury questionnaire be used, or a public
opinion poll be conducted, in order for the test to be applied. While the
litigants might assume the additional expense of conducting polls or
distributing questionnaires, the issue of unequal justice (i.e. wealthy
parties could more easily afford the costs associated with employing the ZTest) would be a legitimate concern. Additionally, the court would be
well advised to closely monitor the polling and questionnaire techniques
employed to insure fairness and accuracy. Finally, the Z-Test is based on
sampling and mathematical reasoning – components that are seldom found
in today’s courtrooms and even less frequently understood by today’s
judges and attorneys. Shortcomings aside, the Z-Test offers a meaningful
133

See Batson, 476 U.S. at 94, 97-98.
See FED. R. EVID. 403. “[E]vidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .”
134
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and non-discriminatory method for the court to honor the spirit of Batson
while remaining within the limitations imposed by Purkett.
IV. CONCLUSION
[61] The ultimate goal of the judicial system is a fair and equal trial system
for both litigants and jurors. The Supreme Court has made great strides
toward this end with its decisions in Batson and its progeny. The Court is
continually challenged to balance the needs of several groups. Defendants
are ultimately concerned with receiving a trial by a jury of their peers that
accurately and fairly represents a cross-section of the community.
Attorneys are concerned with protecting their time-honored right of
peremptory challenge as one of the tools they can employ to zealously
represent their client.
Judges are justifiably anxious that further
complicating the process of jury selection will result in an even more
tedious and time-consuming trial calendar. And finally, prospective jurors
(the most overlooked of these parties) are collectively concerned that their
constitutional right to serve on juries might be restricted by a morass of
facially neutral, but discriminatory peremptory challenges exercised by
overly zealous attorneys. The Z-Test outlined in this article is not a
panacea for the problem of discriminatory challenges; indeed, it is likely
that the problem could only truly be solved by the complete abolition of
peremptory strikes.
[62] Since the elimination of peremptory strikes is unlikely to occur, the
Z-Test provides the court with a mechanism for detecting use of voir dire
responses in ways that may facially comply with Batson, especially as
Batson was applied by the Court in Purkett, but are nevertheless
discriminatory.
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